

Placido Mapa 2
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Placido Mapa
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Metrobank Plaza
Gil Puyat Avenue
Makati City

Interviewers: Prof. Yutaka Katayama, Dr. Teresa Encarnacion Tadem, Dr. Cayetano Paderanga, and Dr. Temario Rivera

Research assistance for the interview was provided for by Mr. Christopher Nex Beñas and Ms. Mary Ann Joy Quirapas. The transcript of the interview was edited by Professor Laura L. Samson and Ms. Rosa Concepcion Ladrido.

< While setting up the audiovisual equipment, the team talks about their daily exercises. >

TADEM: Sir, we would like to go back to some of the economic policies during the Macapagal period.

RIVERA: Probably not so much on the economic policies but the dynamics of the decision making. I noticed from your bio-data that one clear advantage that you had as a technocrat was your experience both with NEC (National Economic Council) and NEDA (National Economic and Development Authority). One of my interests, because I also do comparative studies of East Asian policy-making processes, the NEC as we know very well was very different from NEDA in the sense that you had legislators as members of NEC. NEDA was in a sense insulated from the legislative branch and I wanted to get a sense in terms of the decision-making process and the impact; which do you think worked better given your experience?

MAPA: NEDA. In part because NEDA, which was a merger of NEC and the PES (Presidential Economic Staff), got the benefit of the high-powered staff of the PES that NEC did not have.

RIVERA: Why?

MAPA: In fact, the staff in PES (Presidential Economic Staff) was originally PIA (Program Implementation Authority) which initially Ting [Sixto] Roxas assembled and then [headed by] Armand Fabella... During my time, we took in some [people] and Gerry [Gerardo Sicat] subsequently had some more. In fact, when I was with NEC... I would use those studies that the PES staff worked on and then just issue it as NEC chairman.

RIVERA: When was PES (Presidential Economic Staff) created?

MAPA: Well, it was originally PIA (Program Implementation Agency) and when the [Ferdinand] Marcos administration took over, one of the conditions they stipulated for retaining PIA was to change its nature to PES (Presidential Economic Staff).

PADERANGA: But was PIA created during the Macapagal period? It was not there during the Marcos period?

MAPA: It was President [Diosdado] Macapagal who created it and [President Ferdinand] Marcos retained it but changed the name to PES (Presidential Economic Staff).

RIVERA: And I also recall that the House of Representatives then had its own economic planning [unit]...

MAPA: The congressional economic planning office.

RIVERA: I am wondering, what was the relationship between CEPO (Congressional Economic Planning Office), NEC (National Economic Council), and NEDA (National Economic and Development Authority) ?

MAPA: [There was] no direct relationship... Much of the working relationship depended on the personal relationships of the people involved. Much of the legislation was done through personal relationships.

RIVERA: Of course, in a situation like the Philippines where the politicians are generally much stronger than the technocrats and the bureaucrats, you did not see the NEC format as facilitating the decision-making?

MAPA: No...

PADERANGA: So the president and the politicians, were they good or bad for NEC?

MAPA: It depends. In my case I was able to push it...without the use of the... the active work of the representatives. I already had a working relationship with Congress and the key chairmanship of the different committees of Congress...

RIVERA: You have a distinct advantage of...

TADEM: Sir, you were also saying that within your family network there were different perspectives on policies, right? Although there was no Congress then, you were still part of this network and influence, what was the difference when the feedback was coming informally?

MAPA: [I could] sense the disagreements within society like I had relatives in the sugar industry complaining about NASUTRA (National Sugar Trading Corporation).

TADEM: There was informal pressure in a way but it was still different from the pressure coming from Congress.

MAPA: That's right... I was for a while in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.

TADEM: But you also went to the World Bank?

MAPA: I was in the World Bank and the IMF... but what was interesting in those times, I [saw] what was happening here before I went there... When you have a presence there... the board members were like the members of Congress on behalf of their constituents and countries. As a matter of fact, the staff of the IMF and the World Bank behaved better or responded more to the representations of... countries if they had national representatives on board.

TADEM: Sir, with regards to the role of the private sector in national development, can you expound on it more during the Macapagal period, comparing NEC (National Economic Council) and NEDA (National Economic and Development Authority)?

MAPA: In general, [economic development] cannot count on the government to do everything. It's like the Reagan philosophy, allow the private sector to do its job, and it will do its job, provided there is the right policy framework to encourage them or to deter them from doing things that should not be done. The bulk of [economic] activities should be left to the private sector.

PADERANGA: Was the emphasis the same in the Macapagal and the Marcos administrations, the division between the public and the private sectors?

MAPA: Let me put it this way, during the Macapagal administration, I was not that involved in setting policies, I was [working as] an undersecretary... except in some instances when Armand [Fabella] would let me present my views directly to the president...

PADERANGA: What was the feeling? Would the two administrations have the same position on the private and public sectors?

MAPA: Both had the same emphasis on the private [sector]. In terms of the actual implementation, there could be some slippages on what [they] say [and] on what [they] actually do. As a matter of political philosophy, there was an emphasis on letting the private sector do most of the work except in many instances [when] the government was forced to intervene especially when it came to maintaining the price of rice. [They] had to rely on the NFA (National Food Authority) to stabilize it.

PADERANGA: This was already true during the Macapagal [period]?

MAPA: That's true. From time to time, when an emergency [situation would] come up... the government [would intervene]... I forgot the agency... PRISA or NARIC (National Rice Corporation), during [Elpidio] Quirino's time.

TADEM: Sir with regards to the relationship of the government with the private sector when martial law was declared, it was quite smooth at the beginning but it came to the point when a lot of challenges were coming from the private sector.

MAPA: Initially the private sector, I think, welcomed martial law. I think, business was able to function... more efficiently under martial law and it was generally recognized even abroad that

the first few years of martial law were efficient years. Even the rate of growth went up very fast, close to nine percent and then the oil crisis [came up].

TADEM: Something the government could not handle.

MAPA: In terms of coping with the oil crisis, it occurred to them that maybe we should get more direct hold of resources... and that was when things like NASUTRA (National Sugar Trading Corporation) got imposed...

PADERANGA: You are referring to the 1973 oil crisis?

MAPA: Yes, that's right.

TADEM: So there were policy differences between the government and the private sector...?

MAPA: ...in response to the oil crisis, yes.

TADEM: It was not so much on whatever perceived corruption... it was more on economic policies?

MAPA: That became, I think, the justification for the government to step in and cope with the oil crisis.

RIVERA: Just a quick follow-up on the transition from NEC (National Economic Council) to NEDA (National Economic and Development Authority), do you know whose initiative it was to change the old structure of NEDA?

MAPA: There was a reorganization commission under Armand Fabella who conducted a lot of hearings before he came up with the reorganization.

PADERANGA: This was around what year? 1969?

MAPA: No, no this was around mid-70s.

PADERANGA: It became NEDA, I think, in PD (Presidential Decree) 1 or 2?

KATAYAMA: PD 1.

MAPA: After martial law.

PADERANGA: What do you think was the trigger in putting NEC (National Economic Council) and PES (Presidential Economic Staff) together into NEDA (National Economic and Development Authority)?

MAPA: I do not know if you can call it a trigger but it was a deliberate effort, a result of studies conducted by Armand [Fabella] and a lot of hearings.

RIVERA: But were the studies conducted before martial law was declared or ... under martial law?

MAPA: I left the country in 1970... [it was] implemented after martial law.

RIVERA: You know it is interesting... the logic of martial law would mean that the elected politicians' role would be weakened during martial law. So it made sense to create that kind of body...

MAPA: In fact, during martial law, there was no Congress anymore.

RIVERA: Precisely and so...

MAPA: And there was no [longer any] role for the representatives... from Congress. I was no longer here...

RIVERA: I should go over Armand [Fabella's] interview because he played a major role here.

MAPA: He [Armand Fabella] was the chairman of the [reorganization] commission. I think he did a very good job not only in NEC (National Economic Council) or PIA (Program Implementation Authority) but also in the whole government reorganization scheme.

TADEM: Sir, can you elaborate more on the differences between the commercial policies of the Macapagal and Marcos administrations in general?

MAPA: I think in terms of basic philosophy, they were the same... [However] I think [Ferdinand] Marcos was more efficient because he was better able to deal with Congress; in fact, he would talk to individual members of Congress, the key committee members.

TADEM: Sir, for sure the local industries asked for protection, would you remember particular policies that were there for the protection of local industries?

MAPA: I cannot remember anymore but what I know is that as a group, the exporters were against the retention.

PADERANGA: The retention was put there in 1970s?

MAPA: That was during...

PADERANGA: Or Macapagal, there was already retention?

MAPA: It was either [Diosdado] Macapagal or [Carlos P.] Garcia, it was called margin and then ... during Macapagal's time, decontrol, and then it was changed into retention, in part to take care of some legal terms of the IMF...

RIVERA: In terms of the decontrol policy, because this was one of the major policies of course under Macapagal, one can say that you had confluence of interests there between the exporters and the IMF?

MAPA: No.

RIVERA: Can you give us more information about the contending [forces]... the pros and the cons.

MAPA: That was the importers vs. the exporters; the exporters felt that the exchange rate was not competitive, and the importers on the other hand, especially those industries being protected with allocations and the chief foreign exchange policies, were trying to retain and protect that regime.

TADEM: Sir that dichotomy reflects on whether you were foreign or local investors?

MAPA: I think for the foreigners, they preferred the market force [to operate] in general and also because when it came to... an undervalued exchange rate, there was the element of allocation, the monopoly element and the arbitrariness part of it in terms of allocation so to the extent that foreigners were market-oriented, it was not so much that they favored exporters, they only wanted that the market would be allowed to do more.

TADEM: Sir when you entered the government, was this your ... [perspective] on state planning and the free market?

MAPA: I've always been for allowing market forces, not that there is no role for government as in planning but to the extent of allowing market forces to function, you lessen the burden on yourself in terms of allocation. The market is very efficient... it is not perfect, but it is more efficient than you own arbitrariness in terms of allocation.

RIVERA: But at the same time from our past interviews, the Central Bank for a long time, resisted the shift?

MAPA: They were more concerned with price stability and they were afraid that a change in the exchange rate would trigger inflation, in part because the cost of procurement, of importing commodities would go up and also there would be an increase in money supply when exporters would get more for their foreign exchange. On those grounds, they were against it.

RIVERA: Up to whose governorship was this position quite strong?

MAPA: Up to [Andres] Castillo.

PADERANGA: But it was Castillo who essentially allowed the decontrol because this was during the Macapagal period.

MAPA: The decision was already made by President [Diosdado] Macapagal... I think there was supposed to be a turnover... Macapagal decided to retain or appoint [Andres] Castillo as the deputy governor because he was there already and [so they] made him the governor...

PADERANGA: That was how [Andres] Castillo became governor [of the Central Bank? That seemed like a midnight appointment.

MAPA: Yes.

PADERANGA: Who was the other candidate? I thought it was Castillo all the time?

MAPA: [Dominador] Aytona was appointed by [President Carlos P.] Garcia, [thereby, preempting the decision for] [President Diosdado] Macapagal. Macapagal countered that by appointing the deputy-governor as governor and that way, [Andres] Castillo became the governor.

PADERANGA: So Macapagal had no candidate other than Castillo?

MAPA: He had talked to my father [Placido Mapa Sr.].

PADERANGA: This is not general knowledge. So it could have been your father?

MAPA: I am aware that he had offered the position to him...

PADERANGA: I am wondering about that statement of yours that he had to appoint the deputy... so that was the background... so Castillo was along the line of [Miguel] Cuaderno? He was against some forms of...

MAPA: That was the [underlying] management [philosophy] of the Central Bank.

RIVERA: The Cuaderno legacy...

PADERANGA: I have been thinking, because [Andres] Castillo was in fact an economist, while [Miguel] Cuaderno was essentially a lawyer who was trained in PS bank and in central banking in London... so it was really [President Diosdado] Macapagal who made the key decision to decontrol?

MAPA: Yes.

TADEM: Sir, can I go back, when you say you prefer the free market, where did that develop, was it from your undergraduate experience?

PADERANGA: Can I ask also, did you study under Father Mc Feylin?

MAPA: I did not study economics in Ateneo [de Manila University]. I studied in St. Louise first and then Harvard.

TADEM: Sir when did you develop your paradigm— the perspective that you have when you joined the government, when you were in graduate school? Or there was nothing conscious about it?

MAPA: When I was studying that was what I was exposed to and in Harvard, there was this joke about the Charles River dividing the School of Economics [on the Boston side] and the School of Business [on the Cambridge side]. The business [school] was more republican and the economics department was more democrat. I was in the economics department, on the Cambridge side of Charles River...

RIVERA: So [Evsey] Domer was one of your professors?

MAPA: Yes but he was transferring from John Hopkins to MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). He taught a course for one summer in Harvard and I was lucky enough to take a course there.

RIVERA: One thing about the Harvard legacy for this generation of technocrats, because almost all of them were Harvard graduates, what about it? Why were there so many of them coming from Harvard?

MAPA:... not only the economists but also the lawyers. Many of them went to Harvard...because of the attraction of the Harvard name__ [Jovito] Salonga.... OD [Corpuz], [Jesus] Estanislao, [Bernardo] Villegas, [Amado] Castro, [Benito] Legarda, [Armand] Fabella.

RIVERA: Amazing batch.

MAPA: We were the economists in Harvard. I think most of us were more inclined to [the free] market rather than [state planning]... because that was what we studied; even within US politics, the Department of Economics was closer to the democrats and the business school was close to the republicans...

RIVERA: The Keynesian or neo-keynesian influence must have been quite strong also.

MAPA: Actually, we looked at Keynesian more as an analytical tool rather than as a philosophical orientation.

RIVERA: The policy implication of that...

MAPA: But not in terms of government... not as an influence.

PADERANGA: Was [**name of professor**] still teaching when you were in Harvard?

MAPA: He was really with the faculty but he had to cut down his teaching [load] so I did not have any courses under him. The ones I had were [Wassily] Leontief, [Gottfried] Habeler, [James] Duesenberry, Gershencraw.

PADERANGA: I was thinking of the sociology of organizing the bureaucracy and obviously you had a built-in network of Harvard educated. In a way you had the network and you could call on everybody.

MAPA: No. It did not work that way. In fact, sometimes you disagree.

RIVERA: It was more like, we were trying to trace the recruitment process, was it more on the role of specific individuals for certain periods rather than the Harvard connection?

MAPA: I do not think there was a deliberate or a subconscious tendency to recruit people just because they came from Harvard. During Gerry's [Gerardo Sicat] time, we recruited more people from UP (University of the Philippines), during my time, I recruited more people from Ateneo [de Manila University].

RIVERA: [Rafael] Salas was a Harvard graduate, right?

MAPA: Yes. We were there and we became friends. I think that played a role in his advocating for the retention of all of the PIA (Program Implementation Agency) tasks when [President Ferdinand] Marcos took over.

RIVERA: Did you have a chance to work with Alex [Alejandro] Melchor?

MAPA: Oh yes, very much. In fact, one reason for whatever accomplishments I had was because he was working very close to me. I had Cesar Virata and Alex Melchor as my deputies when I was director-general in PIA. That was why I felt free to spend more time [with] the congressmen and senators for legislative measures...although many times also I would bring Cesar [Virata] with me to work with Pepe [Jose] Diokno in drafting the investment incentive act and the creation of the board of investments.

RIVERA: So how was Alex [Alejandro Melchor] brought in?

MAPA: He was already in the staff of Ting [Sixto] Roxas. When I joined PIA (Program Implementation Agency), he was there ahead of me but I think when Armand [Fabella] became the director general, he appointed Alex [Alejandro Melchor] as his deputy. Then Armand brought in Cesar Zalamea from Philam Life, and made him as the other deputy; I was directly under Cesar Zalamea as assistant.

TADEM: Sir, were there debates framed as economic nationalism vs. internationalism, when you pursue economic policies?

MAPA: The difference was between Armand [Fabella] and [Hilarion] Henares. We were under Armand... we were for more investments, including foreign investments.

TADEM: Sir who were with Hilarion Henares?

MAPA: Maybe the Philippine industrialists then, they were relying on protectionism...

PADERANGA: None of the technocrats essentially.

TADEM: So the president had to do balancing acts between the two or your group was just so powerful?

MAPA: Under Armand [Fabella], I think our group was more effective.

PADERANGA: This was still during the Macapagal period?

MAPA: Yes.

PADERANGA: So it was PIA (Program Implementation Agency) vs. NEC (National Economic Council)? I am going to ask, related to that, what were the roles of other institutions in policy-making at that time...? What about CCP (Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines) and PCI (Philippine Chamber of Industries)?

MAPA: I think there were advocacies... Liling [Alfredo] Montelibano was the leader of the export group; Salvador Araneta was not part of the export group but he was an industrialist and advocated more in terms of [the free] market but he was in protected industries, in the flour and mill industries. He had already been advocating for more market forces during [Miguel] Cuaderno's time and I was debating with Cuaderno.

PADERANGA: I think he had a lot of speeches.

MAPA: Yes and one his books was the economic examination... I was influenced by Don Salvador [Araneta], my uncle. In my initial interest in economics, I spent time chatting with him.

PADERANGA: He was also involved in macroeconomics because he wanted to print more money, the Keynesian point of view.

MAPA: Yes, he was always debating with [Miguel] Cuaderno and [Alfredo] Montelibano. It was interesting because Montelibano... reminds me that Tony Blair did not go to college; Montelibano did not go to college yet he was very articulate in the debates with Cuaderno.

PADERANGA: [Salvador] Araneta was for devaluation?

MAPA: Yes, because he felt that the peso was overvalued.

PADERANGA: And you were also on that side?

MAPA: Yes. In fact, I was advocating [that], because Armand [Fabella] allowed me to present my views directly to President [Diosdado] Macapagal... At that time, it was a matter of 3:20 vs. 4:1.

RIVERA: Now [Diosdado] Macapagal of course was a trained economist from UST (University of Santo Tomas). And again in terms of economic policy making, to what extent did he really take the initiative, rather than let us say [relying] on PIA, considering his formal training in economics?

MAPA: I do not know if he took the initiative but he was able to study the views submitted to him and in the end, he took the position... he was afraid of having too much money that would drive up prices.

PADERANGA: He did not know about stabilization?

MAPA: Stabilization precisely was at the beginning of his term.

PADERANGA: When the exchange rate goes up, it pulls up money supply.

MAPA: Through there are other means like a reserve requirement rather than through the 20 percent retention...

TADEM: Sir, with regards to style, compared to [Diosdado] Macapagal, was [Ferdinand] Marcos more hands on in terms of economic policies?

MAPA: He [Marcos] was quite hands on but he would learn in the process, talking with his staff and the cabinet, to other people, to his advisers because he was trying to learn all the time.

TADEM: Did he have particular biases already?

MAPA: No, he was quite open to economic policies... whatever that would work.

PADERANGA: What would you think essentially were Marcos' objectives, if he did not have any economic policy per se? What was he leading to?

MAPA: His objective was national interest; that was always his guide, whatever if it was politics or economics, whatever policy or ... measure that would support that interest...

TADEM: Sir, with regards to your views on population programs and control, when you came in the government, did you have these views... already...?

MAPA: I think it developed when I was already in government.

TADEM: What were your general views...?

MAPA: I am a growth advocate precisely for export and for allowing market forces to determine the exchange rate which I thought of as a controlled rate and it was discouraging. I am for population growth also because in fact historically, look at the developed countries. They grew because of population growth... I think the problems associated with population were not with the rate of growth but in the misuse of resources and the allocation of resources...

TADEM: Sir were there debates among your colleagues... given different perspectives with regards to population?

MAPA: [It was] not an open debate but, yes within the Marcos administration, there were advocates but they were not that open. Cesar Virata and I would have private conversations but we respect each other's position. They knew I was for population growth and we knew that he was for population control but that did not prevent us from working with each other in many other things.

TADEM: Sir, what about those World Bank population programs...?

MAPA: In the World Bank I was very vocal in trying to oppose [population control] even though I was a minority but I was considered a thorn on the side of [Robert] McNamara in the board because of my views. Actually, whether there was a debate on population and I would say something and he would try to refute me, I would always have the last words and he could not say something after I had my last words.

TADEM: Sir, what was Marcos' take on population issues?

MAPA: In his case, it was matter of balancing all factors; among others, he had to pay attention to the morality aspect because of the Church and the political implications. He would also consider the international pressures. There were democratic administrations, and there was pressure from USAID (US Agency for International Development) to [promote] population control. But he was also aware that the strength of the nation lies in [having] a big population. I pointed that to him... at how the US treated India because India was highly populated and [also] China... the US was more respectful in terms of dealing with them... That was my argument, the bigger our population, the more we will be respected. In fact, the Latin Americans used to say to populate is to govern. A Mexican colleague of mine in the board, although he was advocating for population control, he said that in the testimony of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) director in Congress, he said that the biggest threat in the security of the US was not Russia but Mexico because of its population growth...

RIVERA: What you were saying then was that in terms of the population debate, you were justifying all of these on economic and developmental grounds, there was nothing about your Opus Dei positioning?

MAPA: Not Opus Dei but Catholic...the fact is I am an integral person so I do let my faith guide me but I know also that when it comes to faith and the Church, there is an element of infallibility of the Pope and you cannot have contradiction in truth, between one truth and the other truth. So as an integral person, I allow myself to be guided but I [also] muster all the economic and technical arguments and in fact, even the countries that used to advocate population reduction are now having problems and trying to encourage [population growth] like Singapore and Japan. Japan never tried to control their population growth but now they are trying to encourage population growth.

RIVERA: But ... China is also worried.

MAPA: The case of China is much more serious because they have now the imbalance of sexes. Soon they will not have enough females and there are too many males. It will be a serious problem. And then Singapore is very deliberate in trying to reverse the engine, but it cannot. That's what happens when you fool around with nature, nature will get back at you.

TADEM: So sir what about the Philippines?

MAPA: During Marcos time, because of US pressure, Marcos wanted to accommodate [but] he was also concerned as I pointed out to him, that the countries with high population were the ones [being given] attention.

PADERANGA: But internally this was not an issue during the Macapagal period? I am trying to see when this became an issue.

MAPA: It did not become an issue because the moment it was raised, Macapagal said no.

RIVERA:,,, I am just curious about this, because under Macapagal, the external pressure for this issue was either absent or very weak but under Marcos with all these IMF-WB coming in, naturally there will be pressures.

MAPA: That's right because during Macapagal's time, there was not enough World Bank financing. The IMF was not putting pressure by the way. It was only the World Bank and McNamara who were putting pressure.

TADEM: Could this be traced to the policy of the World Bank or was it something internal?

MAPA: More in terms of the World Bank and USAID especially. That got reversed during [Ronald] Reagan's time and George Bush's time. It intensified during Bill Clinton's time. I am afraid that during [Barack] Obama's, that might again...

RIVERA: The Democrat and Republican dimensions of it.

TADEM: Sir, you were undersecretary of Finance in 1965, do you remember your major projects during that time?

MAPA: No, I do not remember doing anything. All I did was do whatever I had to do efficiently. If I could correct things here and there, asking questions... if it would be recommended for signature and then making corrections if it did not quite satisfy my questions...

PADERANGA: I would have a follow-up on that one, you were back in NEDA in 1980, the NEDA structure in 1980, was it close to PES (Presidential Economic Staff) or NEC (National Economic Council)?

MAPA: The structure? PES (Presidential Economic Staff).

PADERANGA: By the time, you came back in 1980s, it [NEDA] was close to the PIA-PES rather than the NEC structure?

MAPA: Yes.

PADERANGA: But during the time that you were in PIA (Program Implementation Agency), it was much simpler because you would only have the macro, fiscal...

MAPA: No, in PIA we had everything...

PADERANGA: Including the regional?

MAPA: No, not yet. It was a new development, when I came back, we had regional offices.

PADERANGA: ... in the original PIA, was there a geographic view?

MAPA: During PIA's time, we had connections with all government agencies where people from other agencies were detailed to us so we would be coordinating with them.

RIVERA: When you say detailed, it actually meant serving in the main office?

MAPA: In PIA, there was a key member of a department like an assistant... usually they were the brightest. Armand [Fabella] would ask for them [to be] on detail to PIA. They would hold office in PIA. Their assignment was to coordinate with their home department.

PADERANGA: [Armand] Fabella mentioned that.

MAPA: So we had key people from Agriculture, from Public Works. They were assigned to PIA (Program Implementation Agency).

PADERANGA: What were the main topics that the PIA focused on at that time?

MAPA: ...One was infrastructure, an area that was neglected and needed correcting during Armand [Fabella's] and my time. This was where Alex [Alejandro Melchor] was essentially helpful to me... He set up an infrastructure operation center in Camp Aguinaldo. Then we were able to monitor all the different projects around the country. If assistance was needed, we would contact the budget department. There was someone from budget who was detailed in PIA. That would facilitate the monitoring and the execution.

PADERANGA: And aside from infrastructure...

MAPA: Agriculture also.

PADERANGA: Not much macro?

MAPA: Yes with the BSP. On the matter of ceilings imposed by the IMF and the monitoring of the ceilings and the compliance, Central Bank did not have quite the muscle to enforce other agencies' operation but with Armand [Fabella] who was also assistant secretary for economic affairs, he had the muscle and then we would ask them the figures and then they would come to PIA and sit down with us on monitoring the figures and seeing to it that we were within the ceiling. If some other agencies' cooperation was needed [for compliance]... then for example we had to issue treasury bonds or treasury bills that needed to be purchased. Who would purchase that? We would get GSIS (Government Service Insurance System) and DBP (Development Bank of the Philippines) and SNS to [buy] some amount and I would be assisting Armand [Fabella] in terms of monitoring those things, then he would call the different heads of agencies...

PADERANGA: You mentioned ceilings, what were these ceilings?

MAPA: The overall money supply ceilings.

PADERANGA: Were we already under IMF review at that time?

MAPA: Yes.

PADERANGA: Really? So it started with 1961, when we needed decontrol?

MAPA: Yes. We had Project Eagle in PIA (Program Implementation Agency) when we needed to [implement] decontrol.. The people involved there were from the Central bank, Beniting [Benito] Legarda, Johnny [Juan] Quintos and myself. **Joty [full name] Javier** who later joined the RCBC group... was the one assisting me. I was assisting Armand [Fabella]. We even had the loans and investment council monitoring the loans [and investments] of different government institutions... so that they would fall within the overall IMF [ceiling]...

PADERANGA: And this was already in PIA?

MAPA: Yes.

PADERANGA: This would become the public investment staff later on?

MAPA: Or the investment coordinating council but initially, it was called the loan and investment council during [Diosdado's] Macapagal's time. In [Ferdinand] Marcos's time, the name was changed. That was where I made good friends like Gabby [Gabriel] Singson who was representing Central Bank at that time.

PADERANGA: So we had a continuous IMF review, although, we were stretching back...

MAPA: During Macapagal's time. I do not know during [Carlos P.] Garcia's time. I was not involved but during Macapagal's time... it was the PIA (Program Implementation Agency) who made sure that we would be able to comply with the IMF.

PADERANGA: Was there any resident office here in the Philippines or none yet?

MAPA: Not yet. It was during [Gregorio] Licaros' time, not during [Ferdinand] Marcos's time.

RIVERA: Again clarifying the relationship between NEC (National Economic Council) and PIA (Program Implementation Agency), the PIA did not function as the staff of NEC (National Economic Council) itself.

MAPA: No. It was the staff of the President. I just happened to be both head of PES and NEC that I was able to bring about a natural integration.

RIVERA: Was there anybody or staff that NEC could rely on in economic planning?

MAPA: Unfortunately not too much. In terms of a reliable person... not so much of a planner but an administrator, **Nick Cuentas [check name]** was useful to me when I was NEC chairman.

PADERANGA: But didn't NEC have OSCAS (Office of Statistical Coordination and Standards) at that time? They were producing the national income accounts.

MAPA: Yes. It was Tito Mijares.

PADERANGA: Before that was [Bernardino] Bantegue?

MAPA: Yes. They were in two different offices. I think one thing that I needed to do was to reconcile them. Both were my friends.

PADERANGA: So they did not see eye to eye?

MAPA: Somehow during that time they were to work together.

PADERANGA: When did you leave NEC?

MAPA: When I was assigned to the World Bank in November 1970. And then Gerry [Gerardo Sicat] took over. Naning Orosa took over as head of PES; he was one of my deputies then. Alex

[Alejandro] Melchor was also made executive secretary and deputy for defense in place of Erning [Ernesto] Maceda.

RIVERA: ... Because Alex Melchor was with PES... I am trying to understand how he eventually got to be appointed as executive secretary. As you know it, it was a crucial position.

MAPA: There was cabinet revamp, I think, in June of 1970. He became executive secretary and Cesar [Virata] became finance secretary and I became NEC chairman.

PADERANGA: By that time, [Rafael] Salas already left?

MAPA: Yes. Salas left earlier, in 1967.

RIVERA: Before the 1969 election. It must have been 1968 because remember, one of the problems apparently, was that he was interested in running for the senate but he did not get [financial] support.

TADEM: Sir, how was your working relationship with Paeng Hechanova?

MAPA: Not Paeng [but] Feny [Rufino Hechanova]. He recruited me to become his undersecretary. He had a working relationship with Armand [Fabella] as PIA (Program Implementation Agency) head, like the negotiations he was working on abroad.... he would turn to Armand and Armand would find me to work with him.

RIVERA: He did not have any background at all in economics and finance?

MAPA: No, but he [Rufino Hechanova] was a quick learner and we were cousins. In fact I was candle sponsor in his wedding. He had a close relationship with Armand [Fabella]. Armand knew that that he had people under him who also had good access to Feny [Rufino Hechanova]... he knew I was a cousin of Feny and Alex Melchor was Feny's brother-in-law.

TADEM: Sir in our interview with Ting [Sixto] Roxas, he did not get along well with Feny Hechanova who he was related to Armand... He said he did not get along well with Armand. But his niece was married to Armand...

MAPA: His cousin, the wife of Armand, is a Katigbak-Kalaw.

TADEM: Sir for you, what were their sources of differences between Ting [Sixto] Roxas and Feny [Rufino] Hechanova?

MAPA: I do not know. I was not yet in government. I was still in Citibank.

PADERANGA: Which side would [Rufino] Hechanova be in the exchange rate?

MAPA: He was more for devaluation.

PADERANGA: So they were on the same side because Ting [Sixto] Roxas was also for that.

TADEM: Sir, why the need to change PIA (Program Implementation Agency) to PES (Presidential Economic Staff)?

MAPA: I guess PIA might have rubbed off some congressmen and some senators... It was more of a palliative [measure] for retaining the office because some people wanted to abolish it.

TADEM: Because of the policies?

MAPA: I think because of the toughness of PIA (Program Implementation Agency) then. We retained the office but changed the name.

TADEM: So sir, there were really no difference between the PIA and the PES?

MAPA: No difference at all, just the name.

TADEM: The thrusts and objectives?

MAPA: Exactly the same. I made it a point to court Congress because I saw that it was how it would work. I saw [President Ferdinand] Marcos talking individually to congressmen and senators instead of just sending them proposals and asking them to do it. I would ask individual senators and congressmen. Like what I said, I had the benefit of [access to] people who owed my father favors and they received me very warmly. That was how things worked.

TADEM: Sir, in what sense and to what extent was PIA was affecting the people in Congress and their economic interests?

MAPA: The people in Congress depending on who was close to them from the industries would either be for this issue or that issue. Some congressmen were for the exporters. I had the impression that... Mr. [Alfredo] Montelibano... had more friends in Congress than say the industrialists.

RIVERA: Were you also related to Johnny Araneta?

MAPA: Yes.

RIVERA: Because he headed PES (Presidential Economic Staff) for a long time.

MAPA: No wait. Johnny Araneta?

RIVERA: This guy who headed PES during the Martial law years.

MAPA: Was that Gerry [Gerardo Sicat]? During martial law years, I think that it was **Naring [first name] Orosa**. He was one of my deputies. When I left for the World Bank, Gerry replaced me in NEC (National Economic Council) and Naring replaced me in PES (Presidential

Economic Staff). Later in the merger, it was Gerry who became the surviving head of NEDA (National Economic and Development Authority).

RIVERA: You know based on our interviews we can also come out with the study of the evolution of NEDA.

MAPA: Johnny Araneta was also part of the PES staff but he was also the undersecretary of trade. He was not my relative but we were very good friends. We came from the same province. He was related to Paeng [Rafael] Salas. We were both in Ateneo although he was ahead of me. His younger brother subsequently [worked] under me in PNB (Philippine National Bank). In fact, he is now a member of the Metrobank board.

TADEM: Val [Araneta]?

MAPA: Yes. Val [Valentin Araneta], former president of RCBC (Rizal Commercial Banking Corp.) and former EVP of PNB (Philippine National Bank).

TADEM: Sir, in 1966, [President Ferdinand] Marcos placed this communications center in Aguinaldo, do you remember that?

MAPA: The infrastructure operations center. The idea was to better monitor the infrastructure projects and Alex [Alejandro] Melchor was aware of the nationwide network of the Armed Forces in terms of information gathering. So he located it in Camp Aguinaldo just to facilitate the gathering of information.

TADEM: So you found it effective?

MAPA: Yes. Plus he [Alejandro Melchor] was also undersecretary of defense.

RIVERA: That's right so he did not have to walk. It was convenient for him.

TADEM: This Executive Order 357 in 1971 which gave PES additional function, do you remember that?

MAPA: I was no longer here in 1971 but Alex [Alejandro] Melchor became executive secretary in 1970 and there was reshuffle during that time. He knew the value of PES (Presidential Economic Staff) so he continued relying on PES for much of his staff work. As executive secretary, he came from PES as deputy... just as Armand Fabella] was assistant executive secretary for economics affairs.

RIVERA: Can I go back to the land reform issue because it was one of the key policies during that time? One would think that [President Diosdado] Macapagal, given both his socio-economic background and his political agenda, would have wanted a more radical land reform program, what do you think?

MAPA: I do not know if he would have wanted a more radical [initiative] but just to get that legislation through took up all his political capital so by the time he was able to push it, he had no more ammunitions to push the collateral legislation to make land reform effective... other land reform programs like the need to pass the tax measures to [generate] revenue [and] to avoid deficits. All his capital was invested in the passage of land reform...

RIVERA: Which also meant that there must have been a very strong opposition then to land reform...

MAPA: In a sense... you got land [reform] from legislation but without the supportive measures to implement it and make it operative. With the benefit of hindsight, maybe he should have first taken care of the other measures like the financing, the tax measures... it would have been easier initially to push for other measures [and] other things like the machinery for our agricultural productivity, to support the new beneficiaries of land reform. What would they do with the land if they did not have the corresponding technical services and the credit which the landowners were supplying before that?

RIVERA: I think this was also clarified by Ting [Sixto] Roxas, all of these problems in land reform. In one sense it was rather ambitious but as you said without the supporting institutions and resources, it would not succeed.

TADEM: Sir, as an economic policy maker, how much of a threat was the communists insurgencies?

RIVERA: During whose time?

TADEM: Macapagal?

MAPA: I think it was always a thorn in terms of disruption.

TADEM: But do you think the solution to it was more economic or political??

MAPA: It is interwoven. The solution, of course, the more you address the poverty issues, the more these things will be addressed but to the extent that these communists had an agenda, it was not just property [but]... power...

RIVERA: Since we are already on land reform, I might as well follow up the things that you said in the first interview, what struck me... you were discussing two apparently different approaches or models in addressing the land reform problem, one the Hacienda Luisita approach and the Danding Conjuangco approach...

MAPA: The stock option, stock dispersal option and the other one in the case of Danding, he sold his land to the workers, and entered into a management contract with them, so they ended up as the new owners but again being employed by him as the manager and also being paid wages as workers. At the same time, they are the owners. With the benefits of the operations, they will be getting the dividends.

RIVERA: Do you know which one of these worked better from the point of the workers and the tenants?

MAPA: What I am aware of is that in Negros, the Danding [Eduardo Jr.] Conjuangco farm seemed to be flourishing whereas in Luisita, there is a problem now. Some groups are challenging the ownership and also trying to... I guess there are politics involved in that also.

TADEM: Sir going back, when you become the director-general of NEC (National Economic Council), what were the major challenges there?

MAPA: NEC, I only went there for a short while, 1970.

TADEM: The transition to NEC, did you see any difference with regards to the objectives in economic policy making?

MAPA: In the late 1960s, I was only in PES but what happened was in 1966 at the start of Marcos administration, I was in a trip with the president [Ferdinand Marcos] to the US. He wanted to have a development plan prepared and he turned to NEC because it was the legally-mandated body to prepare a plan. When a plan was submitted to him, he was not too satisfied with it but in the meantime, in PES, before the end of the Macapagal regime, Armand [Fabella] assembled a task force to prepare a new five-year development plan for the next administration whether it was Macapagal or Marcos. We had a plan ready for presentation for the next administration. I remember, we went to Baguio in January 1965 to work. Many of the key people of PIA (Program Implementation Agency) then went to Baguio to work for a weekend on a development plan. Subsequently, we fleshed it out, wrote the contents of the outline that we had agreed upon and then we had another meeting to assemble all of it... We had by the middle or end of 1965 a new development plan which we were going to submit to President [Diosdado] Macapagal. We were hoping he would be reelected but he was not so we just kept it. When [Ferdinand] Marcos took over it was on the wraps. Then he received the proposal from NEC and did not like it, he turned to me and asked, "I have a problem with this, can you come up with..." I said, "Yes sir!" We showed him what we prepared in Baguio under Armand [Fabella] and

made some updating and he was quite surprised that, in a short time, we were able to do something and he liked it. He said, "I like this plan and we would adapt this."

TADEM: Sir, would you recall what he did not like about the other plan?

MAPA: I think it was too protectionist-oriented, too nationalistic. While ours, we were not so much foreign-oriented but we were open ... we were after investments. Plus, we had a more detailed program in infrastructure for development.

PADERANGA: Who was the head of NEC (National Economic Council) who prepared the plan?

MAPA: It was Don Filemon Rodriguez but after that, he got sick so I think subsequently somebody was appointed. I think [Alfonso] Calalang was appointed... then [Marcelo] Balatbat was moved from **Comres (clarify)** to NEC and Leo [Leonides] Virata went to...

RIVERA: All these persons were closer to the protectionist tradition right?

MAPA: Yes.

RIVERA: In broad terms... you had the presidential period when we had Congress and the martial law period when we also had technocrats working... in the Marcos regime; in your assessment, under which conditions were technocrats been able to play a more significant role in terms of initiating and influencing major economic policies?

MAPA: I was not here anymore during martial law but I was aware that when I was in Washington in the World Bank as alternate executive director and as executive director in the IMF, whenever there was legislative measure that the World Bank would propose especially if this would be a condition for some of the loans, I would forward them to Cesar Virata and Alex [Alejandro] Melchor. Cesar [Virata] was the finance secretary and governor to the World Bank, Alex Melchor was executive secretary, and Ruben Ancheta was legal adviser to President

[Ferdinand] Marcos in Malacañang. Ruben Ancheta was the head of legal when I left PES (Presidential Economic Staff). I would then forward the proposals and the conditions of the World Bank in terms of what was needed or the conditions for the pipeline. I would get a cable from Alex Melchor or Tony [Antonio] Locsin, another senior deputy of PES and [Cesar] Virata, and they would tell me that the proposals had been accepted... I would forward it to the staff of the World Bank. They would go over it and sometimes, they would point out something that needed to be changed... I would forward it back, it would be amended, and they would send me the final PD (Presidential Decree). Then the loan would be granted. In a sense, it was very efficient during that time and very fast. But as I said during the first few years of martial law, that was how things worked in general, that was why the economic growth was high. After the oil price increase, it disrupted things and maybe the desire for more control of more resources stepped on the toes of people in the private sector and triggered more resistance. Things changed. But for the first few years, I think there was efficiency.

RIVERA: How about the time you took over NEDA (National Economic and Development Authority)? Did you sense that kind of efficiency?

MAPA: We still had the benefit of the PD (Presidential Decree) but when I came back, that was when the Interim Batasang Pambansa was already in place. Then President Marcos did not stop issuing PDs but he asked the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP) to do the necessary legislative work. I forget now if it was still required to have PDs on his part or the IBP already [was doing legislative work]... but then when I was appointed to the IBP... as a member of the legislature, I would work with my colleagues in terms of the things [that needed] to be done. We conducted hearings and...

PADERANGA: This was in 1978?

MAPA: I first came back in 1974 but I was in the private sector, in PCI (Philippine Commercial International) Bank. From PCI Bank, I went to DBP (Development Bank of the Philippines). From DBP, I went to Washington again.

TADEM: Sir, can you clarify your views on taxation policies? What about striking a balance between investment and revenue collection, what was your position?

MAPA: ... There was a time when the tax level was so low that we needed some new tax measures. We worked hard for the passage of the export tax on certain products, which I thought together with the devaluation made it acceptable because they had the benefit of devaluation but then you get the back part of it in terms of taxes, so you do not overburden them with a tax. You first allow them to have the ability to pay the tax plus something above and over the revenue and income. It was always a matter of balance. You cannot proceed with the minimum amount but you cannot also kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.

TADEM: Sir, what can you say about the progressive taxation structure?

MAPA: In general, I think progressive taxation is needed but you cannot carry it out too far. Otherwise, you would reduce incentives for investments. If you have a tax structure like you have in the Scandinavian countries or even in UK, then you destroy incentives for investments. Also, in terms of feasibility and efficiency, it is easier to collect if your rates are lower because people are more inclined to operate and pay rather than evade them. If it is too high, you give incentives for evasion also.

TADEM: Sir, what about the internal and external factors pertinent to the General Agreements on Trade and Tariff?

MAPA: I was not involved in GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Cesar [Virata] was more involved. When he was my deputy, I gave him all the trade [concerns].

TADEM: Sir, what about your views on social reform and development? Did you have any major programs on this?

MAPA: ...In general my attitude towards social reform is that we have to share more to those who have less but you do it in terms of programs that won't penalize the rich... This is the area

where graft and corruption issues come in, because if you can cut down on graft and corruption, you can do a lot more in terms of poverty alleviation.

TADEM: Sir, in terms of budget allocation, what would you be supportive of?

MAPA: Anything that would increase productivity. If you increase productivity you have more to share. That's why for me, projects like infrastructure especially those that are fast gestating...well you have to [strike a] balance between the fast gestating and the long gestating but efficient and productive projects like irrigation. They take a while to implement but in the long run, they are very effective. What would we do now, if we did not have these dams constructed earlier? At the same time, while they were under construction, we had to do other things like faster projects, including irrigation projects that did not require large dams... those that involved pumping projects.

TADEM: Sir, can you recall any debate on the budget or were there other perspectives on budget allocation?

MAPA: Perhaps, where I lost out was when I wanted more for agriculture and less to financing big industrial projects. One because I [considered] gestation and results; agriculture would produce faster in terms of keeping prices down. In terms of industrial projects, especially those that some ministers wanted during the end of martial law, the major investment projects, they had very high capital output ratios.

RIVERA: The [Roberto] Ongpin plan.

TADEM: Sir, do you have particular views with regards to import-substitution... during this period?

MAPA: I wanted to have some degree of import substitution just to reduce our dependence... Many industries when they were put up, they required more capital... I favor a more export-

oriented approach as what other countries did in Asia, those who gave more emphasis to export development first.

TADEM: Sir, how would you assess industrial policies encouraging exports? What were the challenges then for the export economy?

MAPA: I was not that involved there anymore. I concentrated more on finance because remember I got a position in DBP (Development Bank of the Philippines) and PNB (Philippine National Bank).

TADEM: Sir until what time are you available?

RIVERA: Was there any agreement that we can request for continuing the interview?

MAPA: Surely. It's a matter of scheduling.

PADERANGA: I hope it was not too much trouble for you.

MAPA: No. It was my pleasure also.

RIVERA: With Prime Minister [Cesar] Virata, we had [several interviews]...

TADEM: I don't want to tell Dr. Mapa... he might be scared.

RIVERA: We are coming up already with monographs for his interviews. Oh Yutaka you have been unusually silent.

KATAYAMA: <laughs> No.

PADERANGA: He is thinking about the personalities. <laughs>

MAPA: You know I do not know if it is still feasible to do it but looking back, in the past interviews I had, I thought, there were times that we were more productive in sharing when we were jointly being interviewed. I remember the times when Alex [Alejandro] Melchor and I were being interviewed together or Armand [Fabella] and I or Cesar Virata and I. We were fertilizing each other's answers.

TADEM: Maybe if we can have all the transcripts ready, we can seat you all together.

MAPA: Except some of them are gone already...

RIVERA: You know it was a good thing that we were able to interview Armand [Fabella] before his death.

PADERANGA: But we still needed more...

TADEM: Sir we can just contact your secretary...

PADERANGA: On the budget allocation, who were the key people?

MAPA: Jimmy [Jaime] Laya was budget minister. You should interview Jimmy.

PADERANGA: We interviewed him already. He said that we should read his books. We needed to do our homework first. <Everybody laughs.> Between [President Diosdado] Macapagal and [President Ferdinand] Marcos, were there differences in budget allocation?

MAPA: Marcos was president before martial law, so there were budget allocations dealing with Congress...

PADERANGA: Who was more effective?

MAPA: In general, [President Ferdinand] Marcos was more effective in terms of dealing with Congress and in terms of using his cabinet...to follow-up certain members of Congress.

PADERANGA: Especially after the Land Reform law was passed?

MAPA: Yes. I think he has spent much of his capital then.

PADERANGA: Were there key people during this period who were more dominant in decision-making?

MAPA: Well, I was not that close during Macapagal's time but I could see that Feny [Rufino Hechanova] was quite strong... [in] decision-making. There were other people also. Armand [Fabella] was influential but he was clever. He did not get into any controversies with anybody.

RIVERA: What explains the influence of [Rufino] Hechanova on [President Diosdado] Macapagal?

MAPA: I think he worked with Macapagal before he became the president. He was his PR [public relations] man. In the campaign, he was very helpful to him. **Piranta [check]** was also a very influential person. He was more than the defense secretary; he was a close ally of President Macapagal.

PADERANGA: [Rufino] Hechanova was essentially a businessman?

MAPA: Yes. He was in public relations but later became a businessman. He was the contact [in dealing] with the business sector.

PADERANGA: In the case of [President Ferdinand] Marcos, who were the key people?

MAPA: He [President Ferdinand Marcos] had a different style. He had technocrats on one side and then his cronies on the other side. Initially, in fact, during the first term we did not have

much to do with the financial institutions and that was in fact [the cause of so] many of the problems... because their loans were not monitored, were not supervised, and then they over borrowed, that was what led to the crisis of the 1970s...

PADERANGA: In 1970.

MAPA: That was when the crisis broke out triggered by a lack of supervision over the financial institutions in the late 1960s. Although [Gregorio] Licaros was with DBP (Development Bank of the Philippines) then, and it was in a sense part of the problem, what happened when he became the CB governor and [Cesar] Virata became finance minister, we had better report in the World Bank and IMF. That was when they asked the president to have better control on the financial institutions. From then on, the financial institutions were already more or less under the...

PADERANGA: This was already in the second half of 1970s? Can you say that for a long period, essentially the technocrats did not have a dominant influence on the country's financial institutions?

MAPA: Yes. It was only after the crisis of 1970 and 1971.

PADERANGA: The implication there was you did not think of [Gregorio] Licaros as a technocrat?

MAPA: When he became the CB (Central Bank) governor and dealt with the IMF, he became a technocrat but subsequently when there was a crisis, I was away during that time, the Dewey [Dee] thing, there was a revamp in the early 1980s and that was when Jimmy [Jaime] Laya took over from him as CB governor.

PADERANGA: So this came in waves then, the ability of technocrats to sway control?

MAPA: Usually in response to crisis.

PADERANGA: I would read some more...

TADEM: Sir, what about the tax measures you introduced; do you remember tax measures that met opposition?

MAPA: All tax measures ran into the opposition. You have to go to Congress and talk to each one of the senators and congressmen. I remember, in the passage of the export tax and another tax, Cesar Virata and I had to work with the joint conference committee [of]... the house and the senate especially on the tax measures... Then President Ferdinand] Marcos would send Cesar Virata and me to... attend the conference committees. Of course, the congressmen were very pliant to us and would follow whatever we suggested but the senators were not. There were also the high caliber senators. The conference committee senators then were Senator [Arturo] Tolentino, Senator [Sergio Jr.] Osmeña who lost to Marcos and said he was cheated, and Senator [Gerardo] Roxas but again the matter of ties helped because Senator Osmeña was a *kumpare* of my late father and then Senator Roxas, his father [President Manuel Roxas] appointed my father as the first Secretary of Trade and Industry and his wife [Judy Roxas] was the classmate of my sister.... So in part I was able to talk to them because of those ties. I remember Senator Osmeña when I thanked him at the end because he accommodated us. He even made a comment, "Just because Marcos set the house on fire, it does not mean that we do not do anything to put out the fire. We live in the same house." He made that remark. I thought he was very statesman-like...

TADEM: Sir, what did you do when you saw that the imports were more than the exports? The declining export earnings, what immediate steps did you take then?

MAPA: That was I wanted... the lifting of the 20 percent retention to encourage exports.

PADERANGA: I do not know if this was asked before, do you think that the imposition of martial law made your job or their job of pushing the economic [reforms] easier?

MAPA: I think in the beginning it made it easier, in the mid 1970s, but after that, new set of problems came up especially with the assassination of Ninoy [Benigno Aquino Jr.]. Things became difficult.

PADERANGA: Do you think that these economic initiatives would have been difficult to push, if not impossible to push, without martial law?

MAPA: I saw it worked even without martial law when I was in PES (Presidential Economic Staff), it was already martial law but it was with the legislature again when I was in NEDA (National Economic and Development Authority) and when I was in the Interim Batasan. By the way I would like to point out how the laws were crafted during martial law by presidential decrees (PDs). Until now, you have not seen PDs being repealed for being defective, so they were very well crafted.

PADERANGA: For passing [the laws] that was not a necessary condition, these things could be done even without the declaration of martial law. It might just have taken a little more time.

MAPA: Maybe...

PADERANGA: We also asked the people we interviewed. They essentially came up with the same answers.

MAPA: Those were separate interviews but with converging opinions.

PADERANGA: It is interesting that the technocrats essentially had the same opinions.

<end of interview>